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- Author: N M L Nathan
- Publisher: Clarendon Press
- ISBN-10: 0198239548
- ISBN-13: 9780198239543
- Format: 14.4 x 22.4 x 2 cm, hardcover
- Language: English
- SAVE -10% with code: EXTRA
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Description
Beneath metaphysical problems there often lies a conflict between what we want to be true and what we believe to be true. Nathan provides a general account of the resolution of this conflict as a philosophical objective, showing that there are ways of thinking it through systematically with a view to resolving or alleviating it. The author also studies in detail a set of interrelated conflicts about the freedom and the reality of the will. He shows how difficult it is to find a freedom either of decision or of action which is both an object of reflective desire and an object of rational belief. He also examines conflicts about volition as such, contending that the veridicality of volitional experience is no less easy to doubt than the veridicality of our experience of colors. In this context, arguments emerge for a voluntarist theory of the self. Nathan's important book will be essential reading for all philosophers interested in free will, volition, the self, and the
methodology of metaphysics.
EXTRA 10 % discount with code: EXTRA
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- Author: N M L Nathan
- Publisher: Clarendon Press
- ISBN-10: 0198239548
- ISBN-13: 9780198239543
- Format: 14.4 x 22.4 x 2 cm, hardcover
- Language: English English
Beneath metaphysical problems there often lies a conflict between what we want to be true and what we believe to be true. Nathan provides a general account of the resolution of this conflict as a philosophical objective, showing that there are ways of thinking it through systematically with a view to resolving or alleviating it. The author also studies in detail a set of interrelated conflicts about the freedom and the reality of the will. He shows how difficult it is to find a freedom either of decision or of action which is both an object of reflective desire and an object of rational belief. He also examines conflicts about volition as such, contending that the veridicality of volitional experience is no less easy to doubt than the veridicality of our experience of colors. In this context, arguments emerge for a voluntarist theory of the self. Nathan's important book will be essential reading for all philosophers interested in free will, volition, the self, and the
methodology of metaphysics.
Reviews