- We will send in 10–14 business days.
/images/books/5619760/9781107005778.jpg)
- Author: Ian Beckett
- Publisher: Cambridge University Press
- Year: 2017
- Pages: 420
- ISBN-10: 1107005779
- ISBN-13: 9781107005778
- Format: 16.5 x 23.8 x 3 cm, hardcover
- Language: English
- SAVE -10% with code: EXTRA
Reviews
Description
This is a major new history of the British army during the Great War written by three leading military historians. Ian Beckett, Timothy Bowman and Mark Connelly survey operations on the Western Front and throughout the rest of the world as well as the army's social history, pre-war and wartime planning and strategy, the maintenance of discipline and morale and the lasting legacy of the First World War on the army's development. They assess the strengths and weaknesses of the army between 1914 and 1918, engaging with key debates around the adequacy of British generalship and whether or not there was a significant 'learning curve' in terms of the development of operational art during the course of the war. Their findings show how, despite limitations of initiative and innovation amongst the high command, the British army did succeed in developing the effective combined arms warfare necessary for victory in 1918.
EXTRA 10 % discount with code: EXTRA
The promotion ends in 17d.23:33:08
The discount code is valid when purchasing from 10 €. Discounts do not stack.
- Author: Ian Beckett
- Publisher: Cambridge University Press
- Year: 2017
- Pages: 420
- ISBN-10: 1107005779
- ISBN-13: 9781107005778
- Format: 16.5 x 23.8 x 3 cm, hardcover
- Language: English English
This is a major new history of the British army during the Great War written by three leading military historians. Ian Beckett, Timothy Bowman and Mark Connelly survey operations on the Western Front and throughout the rest of the world as well as the army's social history, pre-war and wartime planning and strategy, the maintenance of discipline and morale and the lasting legacy of the First World War on the army's development. They assess the strengths and weaknesses of the army between 1914 and 1918, engaging with key debates around the adequacy of British generalship and whether or not there was a significant 'learning curve' in terms of the development of operational art during the course of the war. Their findings show how, despite limitations of initiative and innovation amongst the high command, the British army did succeed in developing the effective combined arms warfare necessary for victory in 1918.
Reviews