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- Author: Eldad Harouvi
- Publisher: Liverpool University Press
- ISBN-10: 1845198093
- ISBN-13: 9781845198091
- Format: 17 x 24.6 x 2.3 cm, hardcover
- Language: English
- SAVE -10% with code: EXTRA
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Description
This book tells the story of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Palestine Police Force (PPF) in the historical context which impacted the CID's missions, methods, and composition. At first, the CID was engaged in providing technical assistance for criminal investigation. Following the PPF's poor performance in the Arab Revolt in 1929, a commission of inquiry, headed by Sir Herbert Dowbiggin, recommended adding intelligence gathering and surveillance of political elements to police functions. Teams were set up and a Special Branch established. From 1932 the CID deployed a network of live sourcesamong the Arabs and issued intelligence summaries evaluating Arab and Jewish political activity. Post-1935 the security situation deteriorated: Arab policemen and officials joined the Arab side, thus drying-up sources of information; the British therefore asked for assistance from the Jewish population. In 1937 Sir Charles Tegart recommended that the CID invest in obtaining
raw intelligence by
EXTRA 10 % discount with code: EXTRA
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- Author: Eldad Harouvi
- Publisher: Liverpool University Press
- ISBN-10: 1845198093
- ISBN-13: 9781845198091
- Format: 17 x 24.6 x 2.3 cm, hardcover
- Language: English English
This book tells the story of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Palestine Police Force (PPF) in the historical context which impacted the CID's missions, methods, and composition. At first, the CID was engaged in providing technical assistance for criminal investigation. Following the PPF's poor performance in the Arab Revolt in 1929, a commission of inquiry, headed by Sir Herbert Dowbiggin, recommended adding intelligence gathering and surveillance of political elements to police functions. Teams were set up and a Special Branch established. From 1932 the CID deployed a network of live sourcesamong the Arabs and issued intelligence summaries evaluating Arab and Jewish political activity. Post-1935 the security situation deteriorated: Arab policemen and officials joined the Arab side, thus drying-up sources of information; the British therefore asked for assistance from the Jewish population. In 1937 Sir Charles Tegart recommended that the CID invest in obtaining
raw intelligence by
Reviews