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- Author: Harry G Summers
- Publisher: University Press of the Pacific
- Year: 2002
- Pages: 152
- ISBN-10: 1410204197
- ISBN-13: 9781410204196
- Format: 15.2 x 22.9 x 0.9 cm, minkšti viršeliai
- Language: English
- SAVE -10% with code: EXTRA
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"This important book is one man's critical analysis of American strategy in the Vietnam war. That man, Harry Summers, is an active Army officer who began professional life as an enlisted soldier, knows personally the bayonet-point reality of war, and has thought widely about strategic issues. His commitment to the nation and Army he serves is unstinting." "... Colonel Summers has focused his attention at that point in the strategic continuum where military strategy and national policy come together. His main thesis is that a lack of understanding of the relationship between military strategy and national policy caused us to exhaust our will and endurance against a secondary enemy, the guerrilla movement in South Vietnam, instead of focusing our military efforts to check North Vietnamese expansion in support of our national policy of containment. ..." DeWitt C. Smith, Jr. Lieutenant General, United States Army (Retired)
EXTRA 10 % discount with code: EXTRA
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- Author: Harry G Summers
- Publisher: University Press of the Pacific
- Year: 2002
- Pages: 152
- ISBN-10: 1410204197
- ISBN-13: 9781410204196
- Format: 15.2 x 22.9 x 0.9 cm, minkšti viršeliai
- Language: English English
"This important book is one man's critical analysis of American strategy in the Vietnam war. That man, Harry Summers, is an active Army officer who began professional life as an enlisted soldier, knows personally the bayonet-point reality of war, and has thought widely about strategic issues. His commitment to the nation and Army he serves is unstinting." "... Colonel Summers has focused his attention at that point in the strategic continuum where military strategy and national policy come together. His main thesis is that a lack of understanding of the relationship between military strategy and national policy caused us to exhaust our will and endurance against a secondary enemy, the guerrilla movement in South Vietnam, instead of focusing our military efforts to check North Vietnamese expansion in support of our national policy of containment. ..." DeWitt C. Smith, Jr. Lieutenant General, United States Army (Retired)
Reviews