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- Author: Michael C Deprie
- Publisher: BiblioScholar
- ISBN-10: 1249373255
- ISBN-13: 9781249373254
- Format: 18.9 x 24.6 x 0.5 cm, softcover
- Language: English
- SAVE -10% with code: EXTRA
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Description
This study analyzes the German failure to decisively conclude Operation Barbarossa by capturing Moscow, asking whether this failure was the result of disregard for the principle of the objective. The failure at Moscow was the first significant setback for the German Army in World War II. The role played by the notion of the objective in the pre-World War II German Army is investigated along with the backgrounds and personalities of the principal military and civilian leaders involved in the campaign. These background chapters provide the insight needed to understand the relationship that existed between the tactical commander and his superiors during the detailed planning and execution of Operation Barbarossa. The question of whether the German Army of 1940-1941 subscribed to the principle of the objective and properly applied the principle is examined in detail in the study. Extensive use is made of personal diaries and memoirs of German general officers directly involved in the campaign in Russia.
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- Author: Michael C Deprie
- Publisher: BiblioScholar
- ISBN-10: 1249373255
- ISBN-13: 9781249373254
- Format: 18.9 x 24.6 x 0.5 cm, softcover
- Language: English English
This study analyzes the German failure to decisively conclude Operation Barbarossa by capturing Moscow, asking whether this failure was the result of disregard for the principle of the objective. The failure at Moscow was the first significant setback for the German Army in World War II. The role played by the notion of the objective in the pre-World War II German Army is investigated along with the backgrounds and personalities of the principal military and civilian leaders involved in the campaign. These background chapters provide the insight needed to understand the relationship that existed between the tactical commander and his superiors during the detailed planning and execution of Operation Barbarossa. The question of whether the German Army of 1940-1941 subscribed to the principle of the objective and properly applied the principle is examined in detail in the study. Extensive use is made of personal diaries and memoirs of German general officers directly involved in the campaign in Russia.
Reviews