112,31 €
124,79 €
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Insolvency Timing and Managerial Decision-Making
Insolvency Timing and Managerial Decision-Making
112,31
124,79 €
  • We will send in 10–14 business days.
Frederik Drescher addresses the timing of non-mandatory insolvency filings based on threatening illiquidity (§ 18 InsO) with the aim of a company's restructuring as an agency problem between owners and management. Using a decision model, the author develops the hypothesis of a tendency towards delayed insolvency filings and confirms it experimentally. Moreover, he analyzes different incentive instruments potentially leading to earlier insolvency filings.
124.79
  • Publisher:
  • Year: 2013
  • Pages: 191
  • ISBN-10: 3658028181
  • ISBN-13: 9783658028183
  • Format: 14.8 x 21 x 1.2 cm, minkšti viršeliai
  • Language: English
  • SAVE -10% with code: EXTRA

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Frederik Drescher addresses the timing of non-mandatory insolvency filings based on threatening illiquidity (§ 18 InsO) with the aim of a company's restructuring as an agency problem between owners and management. Using a decision model, the author develops the hypothesis of a tendency towards delayed insolvency filings and confirms it experimentally. Moreover, he analyzes different incentive instruments potentially leading to earlier insolvency filings.

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  • Author: Frederik Drescher
  • Publisher:
  • Year: 2013
  • Pages: 191
  • ISBN-10: 3658028181
  • ISBN-13: 9783658028183
  • Format: 14.8 x 21 x 1.2 cm, minkšti viršeliai
  • Language: English English

Frederik Drescher addresses the timing of non-mandatory insolvency filings based on threatening illiquidity (§ 18 InsO) with the aim of a company's restructuring as an agency problem between owners and management. Using a decision model, the author develops the hypothesis of a tendency towards delayed insolvency filings and confirms it experimentally. Moreover, he analyzes different incentive instruments potentially leading to earlier insolvency filings.

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