- We will send in 10–14 business days.
/images/books/13226639/9783658331696.jpg)
- Author: Anja Schedel
- Publisher: Springer Spektrum
- ISBN-10: 3658331690
- ISBN-13: 9783658331696
- Format: 14.8 x 21 x 1.3 cm, minkšti viršeliai
- Language: English
- SAVE -10% with code: EXTRA
Cost Sharing, Capacity Investment and Pricing in Networks (e-book) (used book) | bookbook.eu
Reviews
Description
Anja Schedel analyzes two models in the field of algorithmic game theory which both constitute bilevel problems in networks. The first model is a game-theoretic variant of the well-known Steiner forest problem, and one is interested in an optimal sharing of the cost of the Steiner forest. The author provides (and partially exactly characterizes) network structures which allow for cost-minimal pure Nash equilibria. The second model is motivated from privatized public roads, in which private, selfishly acting firms build roads, and as compensation for their investment, are allowed to set prices for using the roads. For a basic model of this situation, the author shows existence and uniqueness of pure Nash equilibria. The existence result requires a non-standard proof approach since techniques like Kakutani's fixed point theorem cannot be applied directly.
EXTRA 10 % discount with code: EXTRA
The promotion ends in 22d.10:31:37
The discount code is valid when purchasing from 10 €. Discounts do not stack.
- Author: Anja Schedel
- Publisher: Springer Spektrum
- ISBN-10: 3658331690
- ISBN-13: 9783658331696
- Format: 14.8 x 21 x 1.3 cm, minkšti viršeliai
- Language: English English
Anja Schedel analyzes two models in the field of algorithmic game theory which both constitute bilevel problems in networks. The first model is a game-theoretic variant of the well-known Steiner forest problem, and one is interested in an optimal sharing of the cost of the Steiner forest. The author provides (and partially exactly characterizes) network structures which allow for cost-minimal pure Nash equilibria. The second model is motivated from privatized public roads, in which private, selfishly acting firms build roads, and as compensation for their investment, are allowed to set prices for using the roads. For a basic model of this situation, the author shows existence and uniqueness of pure Nash equilibria. The existence result requires a non-standard proof approach since techniques like Kakutani's fixed point theorem cannot be applied directly.
Reviews