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- Author: Michael R Eastman
- Publisher: BiblioScholar
- ISBN-10: 1249405165
- ISBN-13: 9781249405160
- Format: 18.9 x 24.6 x 0.7 cm, softcover
- Language: English
- SAVE -10% with code: EXTRA
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Description
After the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the Department of Defense presented the United States Congress with an official, joint account of Desert Storm. At the same time, each of the military services offered its own version of events to the American people through official histories and in collaboration with non-military authors. While these histories all described the same war, however, they frequently contradicted one another regarding the contributions of the various services to the defeat of the Iraqi Army. Drawing from the theory of organizational politics, this study examines the use of history by the American armed forces during three distinct periods: the defense reorganization of the late 1940s, the Reagan military buildup of the 1980s, and in the years following the decisive American-led victory in Desert Storm. It shows how the services have increasingly considered history as an effective way to shape perceptions of their past accomplishments and influence future decisions regarding roles, missions, and budgets.
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- Author: Michael R Eastman
- Publisher: BiblioScholar
- ISBN-10: 1249405165
- ISBN-13: 9781249405160
- Format: 18.9 x 24.6 x 0.7 cm, softcover
- Language: English English
After the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the Department of Defense presented the United States Congress with an official, joint account of Desert Storm. At the same time, each of the military services offered its own version of events to the American people through official histories and in collaboration with non-military authors. While these histories all described the same war, however, they frequently contradicted one another regarding the contributions of the various services to the defeat of the Iraqi Army. Drawing from the theory of organizational politics, this study examines the use of history by the American armed forces during three distinct periods: the defense reorganization of the late 1940s, the Reagan military buildup of the 1980s, and in the years following the decisive American-led victory in Desert Storm. It shows how the services have increasingly considered history as an effective way to shape perceptions of their past accomplishments and influence future decisions regarding roles, missions, and budgets.
Reviews