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- Author: Douglas A Goepfert
- Publisher: BiblioScholar
- ISBN-10: 1249404088
- ISBN-13: 9781249404088
- Format: 18.9 x 24.6 x 0.8 cm, softcover
- Language: English
- SAVE -10% with code: EXTRA
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Description
This study is an examination of the Army's capability to conduct amphibious assault operations. The Army's post World War II experience is reviewed with respect to doctrine, changes in force structure and equipment, and training effort. A doctrinal Army landing force is contrasted with the Marine Air-Ground Task Force and existing Army units to determine the feasibility of actually assembling and Army force. A discussion of the continued viability and utility of amphibious warfare of also included. The analysis reveals the (1) Army amphibious warfare doctrine is inadequate, (2) Army force structure no longer supports the doctrine, and (3) there are deficiencies in equipment necessary to conduct an amphibious assault. The study concludes that although the Army has a collateral amphibious assault mission, the Army is neither prepared for, nor interested in, conducting such operations.
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- Author: Douglas A Goepfert
- Publisher: BiblioScholar
- ISBN-10: 1249404088
- ISBN-13: 9781249404088
- Format: 18.9 x 24.6 x 0.8 cm, softcover
- Language: English English
This study is an examination of the Army's capability to conduct amphibious assault operations. The Army's post World War II experience is reviewed with respect to doctrine, changes in force structure and equipment, and training effort. A doctrinal Army landing force is contrasted with the Marine Air-Ground Task Force and existing Army units to determine the feasibility of actually assembling and Army force. A discussion of the continued viability and utility of amphibious warfare of also included. The analysis reveals the (1) Army amphibious warfare doctrine is inadequate, (2) Army force structure no longer supports the doctrine, and (3) there are deficiencies in equipment necessary to conduct an amphibious assault. The study concludes that although the Army has a collateral amphibious assault mission, the Army is neither prepared for, nor interested in, conducting such operations.
Reviews