Army Battlefield Distribution Through the Lens of OIF (e-book) (used book) | bookbook.eu

Description

This monograph examines the causes of battlefield distribution challenges and failures at the operational level during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The thesis is that following the logistics challenges noted during Operation Desert Storm the Army mistakenly pursued a course of reforms during the 1990s that focused on business efficiencies at the expense of battlefield effectiveness. The reductive hypothesis that velocity management and "Just-in-Time" logistics borrowed from civilian industry would succeed on the battlefield also obviated the need to assign process ownership for doctrinal, technological and materiel development. Theoretical, doctrinal and historical examples are examined in the thesis beginning with Operation Desert Storm and moving through the initial combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) to the reforms resultant from the perceived failures of Army Battlefield Distribution in OIF. The analysis of these examples leads to conclusions and recommendations that focus on defining a way ahead for effective Army Battlefield Distribution. The recommendations focus on revising battlefield distribution doctrine, Army battlefield distribution process ownership, distribution C4I system development, and avoiding the root causes of future failures. The monograph concludes that the Army currently does not have an effective operational concept for battlefield distribution. Given the critical importance of distribution-based logistics to an Army transforming while at war as part of a joint team, the integrity and effectiveness of the Army's current Battlefield Distribution system must be critically assessed and fixed.