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- Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing
- ISBN-10: 1780527888
- ISBN-13: 9781780527888
- Format: 15.2 x 23.1 x 2.5 cm, hardcover
- Language: English
- SAVE -10% with code: EXTRA
Advances in Financial Economics (e-book) (used book) | bookbook.eu
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This volume contains eight empirical papers that examine corporate governance from a number of different perspectives. Howe et al investigate how governance can influence short- and long-term performance in the case of Special Purpose Acquisition Companies; Javakhadze et al analyze limits to convergence in international corporate governance practices; Barak and Lauterbach focus on the private benefits of control; and Dong examines the relation between the discipline of options and corporate debt and the design of executive compensation. Jiang et al measure the effect of R&D expenditures on bondholders; Gondhalekar et al examine the capital market response to financial restatements; Al-Khouri reports robust evidence that privately owned banks are more risky than government-owned banks; and Luo and Jackson conclude that the positive relationship between tunneling and executive compensation implies personal benefits for controlling shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders.
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- Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing
- ISBN-10: 1780527888
- ISBN-13: 9781780527888
- Format: 15.2 x 23.1 x 2.5 cm, hardcover
- Language: English English
This volume contains eight empirical papers that examine corporate governance from a number of different perspectives. Howe et al investigate how governance can influence short- and long-term performance in the case of Special Purpose Acquisition Companies; Javakhadze et al analyze limits to convergence in international corporate governance practices; Barak and Lauterbach focus on the private benefits of control; and Dong examines the relation between the discipline of options and corporate debt and the design of executive compensation. Jiang et al measure the effect of R&D expenditures on bondholders; Gondhalekar et al examine the capital market response to financial restatements; Al-Khouri reports robust evidence that privately owned banks are more risky than government-owned banks; and Luo and Jackson conclude that the positive relationship between tunneling and executive compensation implies personal benefits for controlling shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders.
Reviews